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Article 3

NOTE
Arbitral Practice and Purpose in Employee OffDuty Misconduct Cases*
Researchers have addressed the influence of several variables
on arbitration decisions with different degrees of empirical support.' Few attempts have been made, however, to empirically
identify the determinants of arbitral decisions with regard to specific types of cases. This Note takes a first step toward eliminating
this deficiency by considering the influences on arbitral decisions
in cases dealing with employee off-duty misconduct.
The primary focus of Part I is the following: Under what
circumstances will arbitrators allow employers to discipline employees for their off-duty behavior? This section first discusses those
variables that industrial relations researchers-and arbitrators-have
discursively identified as important to the arbitrator's decision in
off-duty misconduct cases. It then empirically tests the influence
of those variables on the arbitrator's award. The results indicate
that industrial relations literature paints an incomplete picture as
to what types of evidence arbitrators find persuasive in these cases.
Part II of this Note asks whether arbitrators are persuaded by
another factor: criminal court decisions dealing with the
employee's off-duty behavior. This section will show that arbitrators find important how the criminal law has resolved any formal
charges against the employees. Finally, this Note argues that arbitrators should ignore the criminal resolutions altogether because
the arbitral and criminal forums have different standards of proof,
purposes, and overall concerns.
* The author is indebted to Arbitrator and Professor Edward L. Suntrup, Ph.D., for
his mentorship, guidance, and encouragement in researching this Note.
1 See, eg., Nels E. Nelson & Earl M. Curry, Jr., Arbitrator Characteristics and Arbitral
De"isions, 20 INDUS. REL. 312 (1981) (finding that age and arbitrator experience are significant predictors of arbitral decisions); Marlise McCammon & John L Cotton, Arbitral
Decisions in Subcontracting Disputes, 29 INDUS. REL 135 (1990) (finding that the denial of a
subcontracting grievance was more likely when the arbitrator found that actions taken by
management were neither unreasonable nor arbitrary); Robert J. Thornton & Perry A.
Zirkel, The Consistency and PIedidability of Grievance Arbitration Awards, 43 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 294 (1990) (finding absence of arbitral consistency).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 69:1

ARBITRAL CRIrERIA IN OFF-DuTY MISCONDUCr CASES

In the criminal law, there are two central issues-first, drawing
the line between the kinds of conduct which the community

may legitimately attempt to influence, and the kind which is
strictly the individual's business, off bounds to the government;
secondly, within the category of conduct in which the government has an interest, drawing the line between what may and
may not be influenced through the particular sanction of punishment.2
The world of labor-management relations faces the same concern confronted by Kadish. What conduct.belongs strictly to the
individual workers, and what may be legitimately policed by employers?' Is a worker's recreational drug use any of the employer's
business? Or child molestation by the employee? Clearly, as this
Note will indicate, many employers think so. But on what grounds
do arbitrators agree?
The general rule among arbitrators is as one might expect:
what employees do on their own time is their own business.4
While such a rule may be explained on grounds of privacy, it is
also a function of the parties' contractual relationship. Arbitrator
Bard explains that the terms of the parties' contract-their collective bargaining agreement-limits the employer's discretion in
these cases. "Not merely because an individual has been adjudged
guilty of some sort of moral or criminal malfeasance do his rights
as a citizen become abrogated; nor are his rights under contract
thereby nullified."' Where the contract includes no mention of
discipline for off-duty misconduct, then, employers must justify
their disciplinary decisions in arbitration on non-contractual
grounds.

2 Sanford Kadish, The Criminal Law and Industrial Discipline as Sanctioning Systems:
Some Comparative Observations, in LABOR ARBITRATION-PERSPECTrVES AND PROBLEMS 131,
Proceedings of the 17th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators (Mark L
Kahn, ed., 1964).
3 See id.
4 Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Mark L. Kahn, Discipline and Dischargefor Off-Duty Misconduct:
What are the Arbitral Standards? in ARBITRATION 1986: CURRENT AND EXPANDING ROLES 121,
124, Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators (1986)

(citing Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 38 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 891 (1961) (Duff, Arb.)).
5 City of New Hope v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 49, 89 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 427, 430 (1987)

(Bard, Arb.).
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In some instances, the employer has explicitly bargained for
the right to oversee the .6ff.duty behaviorofits employees. For
example, a bargaining agreement may state that a "violation of
criminal law' or "a conviction of a felony involving honesty,
death other than negligent homicide, morals, drugs, or narcotics"'
is grounds for dismissal. "Other agreements are far more expansive
and may surrender jurisdiction to the company over any "conduct
which violates the common decency or morality of the community.'
Still, the existence of a rule or contractual provision hardly
means that discipline for off-duty misconduct is non-arbitrable:
"the reasonableness of such a rule and the merits of its special
application are subject to challenge before the arbitrator.
A.

Arbitral Standards: In Search of A "Nexus"

The question quickly becomes the standards that arbitrators
apply in evaluating discipline for an employee's off-duty conduct.
Arbitrator Bard summarized the general standard as follows: "The
right of management to discharge or. suspend an employee for
conduct away from his or her place of employment depends entirely upon the impact of that conduct upon the employer's operations."10 The test used by Arbitrator Bard is often referred to as
the "nexus test," or the "nexus requirement."" Under this test,
arbitrators examine the relationship or connection-i.e., the nexus-between the conduct and the employer's business. If the offduty conduct had no adverse effect on the employer's business, no
nexus exists and the company's discipline--often discharge of the
employee-is presumptively invalid. 2

6 Cities Serv. Oil Co., 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1091, 1093 (1963) (Oppenheim, Arb.).
The bargaining agreement explained the rule as necessary for the parties' "mutual protection": -rhere are times when individuals do things or neglect to do things which are
not fair to themselves, to other employees, or to the Company." Id.
7 Nugent Sand Co. v. Teamsters, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 585 (1978) (Kanner, Arb.).
8 Standard Oil Co. v. Oil, Chemical, & Atomic Workers' Int'l Union, 89 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1155, 1156 (1987) (Feldman, Arb.).
9 Hill & Kahn, supra note 4, at 124.
10 City of New Hope v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 49, 89 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 427, 430 (citing FRAK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKouRI, How ARBrrRATION
WoRKs 658 (1984)).
11 Hill & Kahn, supra note 4, at 124.
12 Id. at 154. In addition to being an arbitral standard, the nexus requirement also
exists as both a judicial standard and a codified statutory standard. In upholding discipline for off-duty misconduct, courts routinely inquire as to the nexus, or connection,
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The nexus may assume a variety of forms. For example, the
conduct may have adversely affected the company's business or
reputation, or the employee's own ability to perform his job.3

1.

Injury to the Company's Reputation

Damage to a company's reputation is particularly difficult to
establish. In large part, the arbitrator can rely only on his intuition. Hill and Kahn described the arbitrator's challenge:
To determine whether an employee's conduct has injured the
company's reputation presents a highly subjective issue, of
course, in the absence of any objective measurement of actual
harm. To the extent that the off-duty misconduct is reported in
the press and the grievant is identified as an employee of the
company, the case for discipline or discharge is strengthened,
especially if the misconduct involved a serious crime. 4

between the conduct and the employee's work or the company's business. See, eg.,
Phillips v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1978); Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253
(7th Cir. 1977); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The Seventh Circuit
even introduced the "presumptive nexus" concept for cases where the employee's conduct
is "egregious" and the presumption is not rebutted. See Young, 568 F.2d at 1257.
The argument in favor of the presumptive nexus doctrine is that some conduct
simply speaks for itself in affecting the employee's ability to perform a job or the
company's reputation. Such cases might include drug use, sexual assault, or child abuse.
The federal courts of appeal are split on the presumptive nexus doctrine. The D.C. Circuit, as well as the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, have adopted the
doctrine. See Bosari v. FAA, 699 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1983); Boylan v. United States
Postal Serv., 704 F.2d 573, 576 (11th Cir. 1983); Cosey v. Department of the Navy, 689
F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1982); Wild v. Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., 692 F.2d 1129,
1133 (7th Cir. 1982); Yacovone v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 1028, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
Fifth and Ninth Circuits have rejected the presumptive nexus doctrine. See McClaskey v.
Department of Energy, 720 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1983); Bonet v. United States Postal
Serv., 661 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (5th Cir. 1981). For the Fifth Circuit, even a postal
employee's indecency with a child failed to establish a presumptive nexus.
The nexus requirement is a statutory standard under the Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as amended in titles 5, 10, 15, 28, 31, 39, and 42
U.S.C. (1988)). The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), an appellate agency designed to hear federal employee appeals of disciplinary actions, is also subject to the
nexus requirement. See Neal Miller, Criminal Convictions, "Off-Duty Misconduct," and Federal
Employment: The Need for Better Definition of the Basis for Disciplinary Action, 39 AM. U. L.

REV. 869 (1990).
13 See Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of Am., 99 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
756, 761 (1991) (Goldstein, Arb.). Additionally, the nexus requirement may be described
as the relationship between the employee's off-duty conduct and his job requirements, or
the effect of the misconduct on the business as a whole. See Miller, supra note 12, at
869.
14 Hill & Kahn, supra note 4, at 128.
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As Hill and Kahn suggest, several arbitrators infer injury to
the company's reputation from publicity of the employee's conduct. Arbitrator Nelson demonstrated such inferential analysis in a
National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) decision:
Undoubtedly, ,an article announcing the Claimant's felonious
activity and subsequent conviction which appeared in the November 3, 1984 edition of the Pine Bluff Commercial was read
by many readers who were aware the Claimant was an employe
of the Carrier. It was not, therefore, unreasonable for the Carrier to conclude that the Claimant's misconduct and the resulting publicity had subjected the Carrier to criticism and loss of
good will.15
Similarly, in another NRAB decision, Arbitrator Roukis wrote
that the employee had brought "unmistakable discredit to his
employer" because his assault "was reported in the media (newspaper and television) and claimant was named as a Southern Railway
employe."' 6 Finally, reputational damage
may even be inferred
17
from the nature of the conduct itself.
2.

Effect on Employee's Ability to Perform His Job

A second way in which an arbitrator may find a nexus relates
not to the impact of the employee's off-duty conduct on the employer, but rather involves the relationship between the conduct
and the employee's job duties. A nexus exists where the content
of the conduct is closely related to the grievant's responsibilities.
Arbitrator Riker described this form of the nexus variable as follows:
It would be appropriate (where proof exists) to discipline or
dismiss a security officer who commits acts of theft because his
duties are directly related to stopping theft and apprehending
thieves. Conversely, an employee not assigned to operate a
vehicle, whose license is suspended for off-duty excessive
speeding could not be properly charged with discipline for said

15 St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., National Railroad Adjustment Board Second
Division, No. 11253 (1987) (Nelson, Arb.) (upholding discharge of worker convicted of
drug possession with intent to deliver).
16 Southern Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline Employes, National Railroad Adjustment Board Third Division, No. 21957 (1978) (Roukis, Arb.).
17 &4 &g., Martin-Marietta Aero. v. United Auto., Aero. & Agric. Implement Workers
of Am. Local 738, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 695 (1983) (Aronin, Arb.) (sale of cocaine caused
damage to company's reputation).
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misconduct. 8
Other arbitrators have found a clear nexus where an ambulance corpsman was accused of possession and sale of cocaine"
and where an off-duty truck driver was charged with driving while
intoxicated.' However, a clear nexus was found lacking in a 1983
arbitration decided by Arbitrator Lubic. 5 In SSA, the grievant, a
clerk in the state Office of Disability Operations, pleaded guilty to
illegal sexual activity with a minor. Arbitrator Lubic held that the
grievant's sexual offense did not pose a threat to minors with
whom he worked. Arbitrator Lubic noted that "[tihe fact that [the
grievant] has made sexual advances to minors does not necessarily
imply that he would while on duty attempt to engage in similar
activities with disabled employees or student aides, especially since
nothing even slightly similar to this has occurred over the past

eight years."

2

B.

Broadening the Nexus Test

As discussed above, the nexus test may be satisfied by showing
either injury to the company's reputation, or, alternatively, a
strong relationship between the employee's misconduct and his
job duties. Additionally, the employer may satisfy the nexus test in
two other ways, each of which focuses on the impact of the
grievant's reinstatement on the employer: (1) showing that there
would likely be an adverse impact on other employees or on the
orderly operation of the business if the grievant were reinstated,
or (2) showing that the company would likely incur reputational
damage if the grievant were reinstated. While the first of these
methods-adverse impact of reinstatement-has support in industrial relations literature,' the second method has remained relatively unexplored.24

18 San Francisco Sheriffs Dept., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 155, 157 (1987) (Riker, Arb.)
(citing ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 10, at 658 and upholding discharge of police
sergeant accused of homosexual pandering and possession of marijuana).
19 Personnel Review Bd. of N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
387, 390 (1981) (Simons, Arb.) ("[P]ossession by hospital employees of controlled substances for the purpose of sale, and sale of drugs, both on- and off-duty and off-premises, are ipso facto dischargeable offenses.").
20 Pfeiffer Brewing Co., 26 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 570 (1956) (Ryder, Arb.).
21 Social Security Admin. (SSA) v. American Fed'n of Gov't. Employees, 80 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 725 (1983) (Lubic, Arb.).
22 Id. at 728.29.
23 Hill & Kahn, sup-a note 4, at 133.
24 Hill and Kahn discuss this method, but in the context of "brutal crimes." Id at
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Likely Adverse Impact of Reinstatement on Employees

There are two ways in which an employer may support an
argument that the grievant's reinstatement would likely have an
adverse impact on his co-workers. The first method involves documenting the objections of the grievant's co-workers toward his
reinstatement.' Where the employer is able to produce such evidence, the arbitrator is more likely to find that reinstatement
"could well impact on employee morale and efficiency at work."'
At the same time; the- union may convince the arbitrator that
reinstatement would cause no interference with morale and no
interruption of operations. For example, in Hughes Air Corp. v.
Association of Flight Attendants,2 7 Arbitrator Barsamian overturned a
company's discharge of a grievant in part because his co-workers
testified on his behalf. There, the company discharged a flight
attendant for making a homosexual approach to a minor. Arbitrator Barsamian noted that the offense had little effect on his coworkers:
Absolutely no record evidence exists that any employee of the
Company has refused to work with Grievant in consequence of
the .

.

. incident, or has expressed a reluctance to. work with

him. On the contrary, his Union presented a number of witnesses, substantially all of whom were fellow employees, who
testified in Grievant's behalf.'
A second approach in establishing a likely adverse impact involves the argument that the grievant's reinstatement would pose a
threat to the safety of other workers. For example, in -Common-

128. The poteliaZ for adverse public opinion may be deemed sufficient to warrant a
dismissal even without an objective showing that the company's reputation has been affected." Id.
25 Arbitrator Nolan stated: "[F]irm evidence that the employee would not be able to
work with his former co-workers will satisfy the nexus requirement." United States Postal
Serv. v. National Ass'n. of Letter Carriers, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 495, 500 (1987) (citing
Bonet v. United States Postal Serv., 712 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1983), a case wherein "the
employer submitted affidavits from five subordinates of the plaintiff stating that they
could no longer work effectively for him. A majority of the court found this substantial
evidence of the required nexus." ).
26 Zenith Electronics Corp., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 157, 160 (1986) (Doering, Arb.)
(upholding three-day suspension of employee for fighting with a union steward in front
of coworkers at a tavern near place of work).
27 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 148 (1979).
28 Id. at 158.
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wealth of Pennsylvania,' Arbitrator Stonehouse heard a high-profile
case of a liquor store clerk's brutal off-duty conduct. "[O]n a
downtown street in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, during an altercation
with his wife, the grievant beat [to death] a bystander, one Marguerite Lingenfelter, who was 71 years of age. According to the
news media, Miss Lingenfelter had asked him to stop beating his
wife."' Arbitrator Stonehouse found just cause for the grievant's
discharge in the danger he posed to others: "Certainly the widely
publicized assault by the grievaht upon an elderly woman would
tend to create feelings of danger and fear among the grievant's
fellow employees and hesitancy among customers to enter the
31
store and deal with him."

2.

Likely Damage to Employer's Reputation if Grievant Reinstated

A final, and relatively unresearched, way in which the company may satisfy the nexus test again involves damage to its reputation. However, in this context, the damage cannot be proven, only
predicted. The company argues that the grievant's reinstatement
would likely cause damage to its goodwill, or reputation, and that
it simply cannot afford the risk of re-employing the grievant. Hill
and Kahn mentioned such speculative reputational damage in the
context of "brutal crimes such as murder or sexual assault": "The
potential for adverse public opinion may be deemed sufficient to
warrant a dismissal even without an objective showing that the
company's reputation has been affected." 2
This Note will establish that this conception of the nexus test
is not limited to notorious or violent offenses; the argument of
likely reputational damage is also available to employers faced with
less serious crimes. For example, Arbitrator LaManna ruled in a
1985 case that "Ilt]he smoking of marijuana by an off-duty Corrections Officer and Peace Officer in the presence of minors on
more than one occasion is an action of sufficient severity, likely to
bring considerable discredit on the Employer, to warrant discharge
on its own."" Similarly, Arbitrator Stouffer found that the company was justified in discharging a grievant charged with indecen-

29 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 280 (1975) (Stonehouse, Arb.).
30 Id at 281.
31 I. at 282.
32 Hill & Kahn, supra note 4, at 128.
33 N.Y. State Dep't of Corrections, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 793, 797 (1985) (LaManna,
Arb.) (emphasis added).
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cy.' The Arbitrator agreed with the company that reinstatement
could have a "detrimental effect" 5 on its reputation and "might
reasonably be expected to affect the employer's affairs. " -'
It should be noted that this conception of the nexus
test-likely damage to the company's reputation or image-does
not garner universal support among arbitrators. Though a significant factor in arbitral decisions, 7 some arbitrators reject it as altogether too speculative. In a case where the grievant pleaded
guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, Arbitrator LaCugna
held that the company had "failed to adduce hard, specific, and
compelling evidence to show the Grievant's act did actually and
adversely affect the Company." s Company statements such as
"continued employment would be damaging to the Employer's
reputation" were too hypothetical to factor into the Arbitrator's
decision. 9
C.

Testing the Nexus Definitions

Support for the proposition that arbitrators require a nexus in
off-duty misconduct cases has largely been anecdotal rather than
empirical.' Four separate conceptualizations of the nexus requirement were discussed above. The purpose of this section is to
empirically test, for the first time, their influence on arbitral decisions in off-duty misconduct cases.
The effect of the off-duty conduct on the company's reputation, or on the grievant's ability to perform his job, represent
traditional conceptualizations of the nexus requirement.4 As discussed above, Hill and Kahn offer two additional considerations
for the arbitrator, both of which are forward-looking: (1) whether
reinstatement would likely cause injury to the company's reputation,' and (2) whether reinstatement would adversely affect the

34 Tibbetts Plumbing-Heating Co. v. Teamsters, 46 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 124 (1966)
(Stouffer, Arb.).
35 Id. at 125.
36 Id at 127 (emphasis added).
37 See -infra Part I.C.
38 Italco Aluminum Corp., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 66 (1977) (LaCugna, Arb.).
39 Id, see aso Raytheon Co. v. International Bhd. Elec. Workers Local 1505, 66 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 677, 677 (1976) (Turkus, Arb.) ("Mere surmise, conjecture or speculation as
to the adverse effect upon its operations or its business because of the nature per se of
the alleged misconduct is insufficient.").
40 Se, eg., Hill & Kahn, supra note 4, at 124.
41 Id. at 124-26.
42 Id. at 128.
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morale or safety of the grievant's co-workers. 3 Thus, the four elements of the nexus requirement may be set out as follows:
1.

2.

There is a strong relationship between the employee's offduty conduct and his job requirements ("strong relationship");
The Company suffered actual reputational damage as a
result of the Grievant's conduct ("actual reputational damage").

The nexus requirement, as set forth above, may also be described in speculative, prospective terms:
3.

4.

1.

The Company would likely incur reputational damage if the
Grievant were reinstated ("likely" or "possible reputational
damage");
There would likely be an adverse impact on other employees or on the orderly operation of the business if the
Grievant were reinstated ("likely" or "possible adverse
impact").

The Dataset

The dataset used in this section consists of 125 labor arbitration cases involving discipline for alleged employee off-duty misconduct. The vast majority of the cases were extracted from Labor
Arbitration Reports (volumes 35 through 94), a Bureau of National Affairs' publication which publishes complete arbitral decisions.
Other sources included unpublished arbitration decisions obtained
from arbitrators and from the American Association of Arbitrators.
In order to avoid arbitral bias, no arbitrator was used more than
once.

The industries represented in this dataset are diverse and
include, but are not limited to, steel, railroad, oil, transportation,
financial, and retail. Off-duty conduct which companies found actionable included assault and battery, murder, rape, molestation,
drug possession or drug trafficking, fraud and burglary.
The "nexus" test was defined to include any of the four elements set forth above. The purpose of the dataset was to determine the importance of each of the elements to the arbitrator's
decision in off-duty misconduct cases."

43 Id. at 133-35.
44 Non-linear logit estimation was used to determine the effect of the nexus elements on the dependent variable, the arbitral outcome. The dependent variable in this
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A Nexus Variable with Many Influential Dimensions

The results indicate that the nexus requirement is multi-dimensional. 3 The traditional nexus definition, i.e. a "strong relationship" between the off-duty misconduct and the employee's job
requirements, had a significant impact on the arbitrator's decision.' More revealing, other conceptions of the nexus requirement enjoyed as much or more influence as the traditional nexus
definition." The possible reputational damage and possible adverse impact arguments are future-based but highly influential
nevertheless.' This is likely a conscious recognition on the
arbitrator's part that the employer's interests should not be limited
to the tangible, immediate effects of employee off-duty conduct.
The significance of the speculative, future-oriented elements
of the nexus requirement indicates that arbitrators are interested
not only in the nature of the grievant's offense, but also in the
hypothetical effects of such an offense on the employer. Since the
burden of proof lies with the company, it must surely be lessened
by the influence enjoyed by these arguments. For company representatives in the arbitral process, the appeal of emphasizing the

study is dichotomous, and was coded as a 0 if the grievance was denied in whole and a
1 if it was denied in part. If the arbitrator returned a discharged grievant to work but
refused to consider him for backpay or lost benefits, or if the arbitrator reduced in
length a disciplinary suspension, then the grievance was considered to have been denied
in part. Grievances denied in whole contain no such provisions and upheld the
company's discipline in its entirety. Of the 125 cases, 79 were denied in whole and 46
were denied in part.
The four nexus elements constituted independent variables. In order to control for
quantum of discipline considerations, two additional dichotomous independent variables
were included: (1) whether the grievant's offense was severe and (2) whether the
grievant's work record-was poor.
45 Each of the independent variables was statistically significant in estimating the
arbitrator's outcome, and the majority were significant at the .01 level. The coefficients
and asymptotic t-ratios (in parentheses) were: Constant, .723" (3.85); (1) Strong Relationship, -.952- (2.07); (2) Actual reputational damage, -1.204- (-2.66); (3) Possible
reputational damage, -1.140W. (-1.92); (4) Possible adverse impact, -1.976- (-3.58); " significant at .10 level; *"significant at .05 level; - significant at .01 level; one- or two-tailed
test as appropriate.
46 The logit estimates indicate that an arbitrator is 7.5 times more likely to deny a
grievance in whole rather than in part if a strong relationship between the employee's
conduct and job requirements is observed.
47 The logit estimates indicate that the probability of reinstatement is .19 given actual reputational damage to the company. Interestingly, the probability of reinstatement
given the possibility of future reputational damage is even less-.09.
48 When found together, the probability of reinstatement by the arbitrator is only
.01.
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future-based aspect of the nexus requirement lies in the fact that
"possible reputational effect" and "possible adverse impact on coworkers" are concerns that cannot be proven, but can only be described as likely. The burden of proof may not rest upon the
union, but it is affected as well: factual arguments may be refuted
by revisiting the evidence in a case; speculative arguments, however, are more difficult to contest.
In most cases, the arbitrator considered the severity of the offense, along with the grievant's work record, to indicate the appropriate quantum of discipline. In eight cases, however, the arbitrator found a presumptive nexus through the severity of the misconduct. None of the employees involved in these cases were reinstated.
Hill and Kahn's prescription regarding the importance of the
traditional nexus requirement" was confirmed through the
dataset, as was the general expectation that arbitrators are swayed
by evidence establishing the negative impact of the off-duty misconduct on the company. However, the results indicate that the
nexus requirement has many elements and cannot be easily condensed. For example, arbitrators were swayed not only by any
factual reputational damage incurred by the company, but also by
any evidence that while such damage has yet to occur, it remains
as a possibility.
The speculative conceptualizations of the nexus requirement
were more influential when used in tandem. For example, when
the arbitrator finds a nexus through possible reputational damage
to the company, the probability that the grievant will be reinstated
is .09. However, when this finding is coupled with a second speculative element-possible adverse impact on coworkers-the probability of reinstatement decreases to .01.
In general, the results confirm that the nexus test may be
satisfied in many ways. The traditional nexus understanding emphasizes the strong relationship between the off-duty misconduct
and the grievant's job requirements. For example, the case of a
school bus driver convicted of using drugs while off-duty would
satisfy this understanding of the nexus principle. However, the
results indicate that arbitrators have broadened the nexus test. A
nexus may be found in a number of other ways: by finding that
the employee's misconduct has damaged the company's reputation, that reinstatement of the employee would likely cause damage

49 Hill & Kahn, supra note 4, at 124.
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to the company's reputation, or that reinstatement could adversely
affect co-workers' morale or safety.
II.

THE INFLUENCE OF CRIMINAL COURT DECISIONS ON THE

ARBITRATION OF OFF-DUTY MISCONDUCT CASES

Part I of this Note empirically examined the influence of the
"nexus" variable-in its many forms-on the arbitrator's decision.
Part I focused on the off-duty conduct of the employee and "the
impact of that conduct upon the employer's operations."' Part II
of this Note discusses those cases in which a court and an arbitrator have each evaluated the same conduct of a particular employee-i.e., those cases requiring both criminal and industrial resolutions. For arbitrators, the question quickly becomes how much
weight, if any, criminal law decisions should be given when passing
on a grievant's discharge or suspension for off-duty misconduct. Is
it important to arbitrators whether the court finds the grievant
criminally liable for his conduct?
As Part I of this Note indicated, employers are very much
concerned with the "private," off-duty activities of their employees.
Part II will show that arbitrators find it important how the criminal law has resolved any formal charges against the employee.
Finally, this Note argues that arbitrators should ignore the criminal resolutions altogether because the arbitral and criminal law
forums have distinct purposes and advance vastly different concerns.
A.

The Line Between Arbitration and the Courts

Harry Shulman, in his classic paper on reason, contract, and
law in labor relations, wrote this on the tendency of parties to the
collective bargaining relationship to involve external law in resolving disputes:
The arbitration award is an integral part of the system of self
government .. .. The courts cannot, by occasional sporadic
decision, restore the parties' continuing relationship; and their
intervention in such cases may seriously affect the going systems of self-government. When their autonomous system breaks
down, might not the parties better be left to the usual methods
for adjustment of labor disputes rather than to court actions

50 City of New Hope v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 49, 89 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 427, 430 (1987) (Bard, Arb.).
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on the contract or on the arbitration award?"'
The separation between the courts and arbitration to which
Shulman refers is grounded as much in practicality as it is in philosophy. Labor arbitration exists as a specialized form of dispute
resolution, and neither the courts of today nor scholars such as
Shulman would suggest that the judicial process is a more desirable one in which to resolve union-management disputes. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has often affirmed the principle that parties to
a collective bargaining agreement must accept an arbitrator's interpretation of the contract over a court's and that a reviewing court
could not reject such an interpretation simply on the grounds that
it disagreed.52
For parties feeling wronged by an arbitrator's ruling, the Supreme Court has established some direction as to when cause for
judicial review is absent. Arbitral immunity," while hardly absolute,
is likely to be unchallenged by the courts so long as an arbitration
award "draws its essence" from the language of the bargaining
agreement.'
The distinction between arbitral and judicial responsibility is further defined by the fact that legal doctrines such as
stare decisis, res judicata, and collateral estoppel are generally not
considered binding on arbitrators.5 5
Of course, arbitration and the courts cannot be considered
mutually exclusive. Arbitrators rule on issues involving double
jurisdiction where both they and the courts are forced to interpret
or apply contractual language. For example, arbitrators may, as
Feller noted, interpret a seniority provision "inserted into a collective bargaining agreement as a result of a Title VII decree [and]
under which the court retains jurisdiction."" Still, cases wherein

51 Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, -68 HARV. L. REV.
1024 (1955).
52 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) ('The
courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties
may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract."); see also Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97
(1960) (the arbitral award is legitimate if it "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement" and is not merely the arbitrator's "own brand of industrial justice").
53 For an excellent discussion of arbitral immunity, see Dennis Nolan & Roger I.
Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INDUS. REL. LJ. 228 (1989).
54 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
55 Howard Block, Decisional Thinking: West Coast Panel Repor, in DECISIONAL THINKING
OF ARBrrlrkTORS AND JUDGES 158, Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting, National
Academy of Arbitrators (J.L. Stern & B.D. Dennis eds., 1981).
56 David E. Feller, Arbitration. The Days of Its Gloy are Numbered, 2 INDUS. REL L.J. 97

(1977).
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both arbitration and the courts must resolve identical disputes
generally represent the exception.
Rulings in Non-Arbitral Forums as a Source of Evidence in

1.

Arbitration
Arbitrators disagree with respect to the appropriateness of
using legal conclusions drawn from non-arbitral forums in framing
decisions in an arbitration case. Prior rulings by administrative
agencies may well be disregarded by arbitrators as beyond the
"four corners of the contract." What this Note will establish, however, is that arbitrators do in some cases give weight to rulings
coming from other legal forums and then treat such rulings as
evidence.
The arbitral rule of thumb is that the evidentiary weight accorded non-arbitral rulings is determined by the authority of the
agency making the, ruling.'7 Likewise, arbitrators have, looked to
statutory law for guidance in framing conclusions in cases which
bring them beyond the four comers of the contract. For example,
arbitrators have concluded that statutory requirements or guidance
dealing with returning veterans, national security issues and so on
must be evidentiary considerations.'
But what of court decisions dealing with the same issue before
the arbitrator? In certain kinds of cases there exist parallel attempts to resolve the alleged inappropriateness of employee behavior. Cases dealing with off-duty behavior provide an example of
this. Consider the case of an alleged violation -by an employee of a
state controlled-substance law. While that case is being processed
by the courts, the employer may become aware of the employee's
alleged actions and levy disciplinary actions.
If the typical steps of labor-management grievance resolution
do not result in the employee's reinstatement, the employee may
frequently bring the case to arbitration. In the interim, a determination is made by the court as to whether the employee violated the drug laws. The question then arises whether the arbitrator
ought to use the decision by the courts in this type of case-or in
any type of case for that matter-as evidence in framing an arbitral conclusion.

57
58

See generaly ELKOURI & ELKOUIU, supra note 10, at 390.
Id. at 380.
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Court Decisions As Evidence

Arbitral precedent clearly dictates that "It]he arbitrator may
choose to consider external law along with the collective agreement."59 However, as a matter of practice, no universal guideline
directs arbitrators in the use of court decisions as evidence. At
present, the following general considerations exist: (1) Arbitrators
generally feel constrained to follow court decisions of last resort issued by a state or the United States Supreme Court;,6 (2) Arbitrators generally feel less constrained, however, to honor lower
court decisions. 61 At bottom, there is a strong tradition within the
trade against according court decisions evidentiary weight:
The standards of proof, the relevant policies at issue, the cast
of judgment of the triers of fact, and the environment in
which the respective hearings take place are sufficiently different
to warrant the conclusion that a decision in one tribunal should not
bind the other .... 62
B.

Do Court Decisions Matter? The Case of Off-Duty Misconduct

The primary purpose of this section is to test the hypothesis
that arbitrators decide cases independent of the decisions of other
tribunals. Specifically, the question is whether arbitrators, charged
with deciding employee off-duty misconduct cases, treat collateral
court decisions as relevant to their award. The dataset used in Part
I was used for this analysis.
1. Court Decisions Matter
In an off-duty misconduct case, the arbitrator must resolve two
issues: (1) Did the grievant do the act in question, and (2) If he
did, what is the appropriate quantum of discipline?
What considerations should factor into the arbitrator's decision? Arbitral theory generally holds that the risk is not hearing
enough relevant evidence, rather than in hearing too much, and

59 Id. at 378.
60 Id. at 390 n.79.
61 Id. at 390 nn.80, 81.
62 MARvIN HiuL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 67 (1980)
(emphasis added) (quoting R&port of the West Coast Tripartite CommiUee, in PROBLEMS OF

PROOF IN ARBIrrRATION 206, Proceedings of the 19th Annual Meeting, National Academy

of Arbitrators (1967)). The Committee goes on to say that decisions from other tribunals "should [nevertheless] be admissible as relevant evidence." Id.
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arbitrators usually cast a wide net of admissibility as a result.'
However, as this Note argues, there are dangers to such a loose
standard.
In approximately one-half (61 of 125) of the arbitration cases,
the arbitrator explicitly referred to court decisions dealing with
the misconduct under consideration by the arbitrator. In other
words, the court decisions themselves became part of the
arbitrators' evidentiary considerations.
.Of the 61 arbitrators who referred to the court's decision, 35
(57%) appeared to be particularly influenced by that decision.
The influence enjoyed by the court decisions was measured narrowly: in each of the 35 cases, the arbitrator explicitly stated that
the court decision was significani. In 23 of the 35 cases, the arbitrator partially relied on the court verdict in deciding the merits
of the case or whether enough proof was introduced in arbitration
to assign guilt." In 15 of the 35 cases, the arbitrator relied on
the sentence imposed by the court in resolving the quantum, or
quantity, of appropriate discipline issue.' Finally, in 3 of the 35
cases, the arbitrator at least partially relied on both the verdict
and the subsequent sentence of the court in assigning guilt and
discipline for the conduct.
2.

Problems Posed by Relying on Criminal Court Decisions
The line which separates arbitration from the courts disappeared in this study. This disappearance carries with it four notable concerns.
(a) Burden of Proof-The most serious concern may be that
some arbitrators apply an inappropriate standard of evidence when
resolving grievances. Schmertz states that "beyond a reasonable
doubt is not a standard of proof in arbitration cases; that is the
criminal standard.' ° If so, then criminal court verdicts would be

63 Shulman, supra note 51, at 1024.
64 See, eg., Rohr Industries, 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1298 (1972) (Rule, Arb.) (accepting
judgment of the court, which dismissed arson charge against grievant); Continental Banking Co. v. Bakery, Confectionary and Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1142 (1987) (Gordon, Arb.) (finding that company had no obligation to reinstate grievant until she produced a court document announcing the court's dismissal of charges).
65 See, eg., Indian Head, Inc. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 83
(1978) (Rimer, Arb.) (finding it dispositive that Court put grievant on probation for drug
possession and found him not guilty of drug trafficking).
66 Eric Schmertz, Evidentmay Considerations, in A PRIMER FOR ARBrTRATORS 78 (1985).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 69:1

inappropriate indications of a grievant's "guilt" in arbitration, as
grievance arbitration applies a lesser standard of evidence. Others
describe the arbitral standard for discharge cases as a standard
between "preponderance" and "beyond a reasonable doubt," which
is often referred to as a "clear and convincing" standard.'
If the courts and arbitrations apply disparate standards of evidence, then judicial verdicts of innocence may not necessarily imply similar arbitral decisions. In fact, arbitrators should plainly not
import criminal acquittals or dismissals into the arbitral process.'
An employee acquitted of drug use in a criminal courtroom may
still be found guilty under a lesser standard in arbitration. The
arbitrator who relies on the court's decision has forced the employer to fulfill a harsher burden of proof than is ordinarily expected.' Only guilty verdicts would seem to have any relevance
to the arbitration: for example, an employee correctly found guilty

67 It is well settled in arbitral jurisprudence "that the criminal law standards are not
applicable in employment relations." Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA).
409, 413 (1984) (Maniscalco, Arb.). The criminal law standard should not be required
because there is a fundamental distinction between criminal proceedings and the arbitral
forum: the former involves governmental action against individuals while the latter does
not. Historically, proof beyond a reasonable doubt "was a political check upon [the]
power of the government against individuals." Visiting Nurse Assoc., 86-1 (CCH) 1 8024,
at 3099 (1985) (Askin, Arb.). Government sanctions go beyond depriving a worker of his
livelihood and tarnishing his reputation within the community; they may also involve imprisonment and the deprivation of civil liberties. Since the criminal and arbitral forums
impose different risks on the accused, different standards of proof should be required.
Id. See grnera/ly American Steel Foundries, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 745 (1990) (Seidman,
Arb.); Kansas CUy, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 413; Armour-Dial Inc., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 96
(1981) (Aaron, Arb.).
68 See San Francisco Sheriff's Dep't, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 154 (1987) (Riker, Arb.)
(finding the fact that criminal charges were dropped irrelevant to an administrative hearing); Genesee County v. Social Serv. Workers Union, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 48, 48 (1987)
(House, Arb.) ('as to the dropped charges, if [shoplifting] is present, an employee is still
subject to discipline even if civil authorities do not act"); Wayne State Univ. v. United
Auto Workers, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 953 (1986) (Lipson, Arb.) (ruling that the Arbitrator
is not bound by a court's dismissal of criminal charges and may accept all relevant evidence).
69 One arbitrator went so far as to rule that "a determination of innocence in the
criminal forum does increase the Employer's burden of persuasion that discharge is warranted." City of Muskegon Heights Police v. Teamsters, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 675, 675
(1987) (Girolama, Arb.) (emphasis added). The better view is that "the mere fact of an
acquittal does not preclude an arbitrator from upholding management's action where
adequate evidence is presented of the misconduct alleged." Indiana Bell Tel. v.
Communication Workers, 99 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 756, 756 (1992) (Goldstein, Arb.); see also
Associated Grocers v. United Wholesale & Warehouse Employees Local 261, 83 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 261 (1984) (Odom, Jr., Arb.); City of Pontiac v. Police Officers Ass'n, 77 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 765 (1981) (Ott, Arb.); Personnel Review Bd. of New York City Health &
Hosps. Corp., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 387 (1981) (Simons,'Arb.).
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of drug use beyond a reasonable doubt ought to be found guilty
under a lesser arbitral standard. °
(b) Separateness.-Even arbitrators who reasonably rely on the
guilty verdicts of courts ignore a second concern: the separateness
of the distinct forums raised by Shulman. The two forums of dispute resolution cannot truly be considered separate if arbitrators
must 'delay their decision until the courts have resolved the issue
of guilt. In such a capacity, arbitrators merely apply court verdicts,
further exposing themselves to judicial review. An arbitrator faced
with an off-duty conduct case may even go so far as to interpret
the language of the court, as if the' verdict itself was somehow
incapable of communicating guilt, innocence, or the appropriateness of punishment. One arbitrator in this study interpreted a
guilty plea to be the result of a plea bargain and subsequently
found insufficient proof to exist against the grievant.7 1 The role
of the arbitrator who interprets the judicial record is an unfortunate, less active one which Feller alluded to when he wrote: "They
may even be used as assistants to the courts or the EEOC as special masters."72
(c) Consistency.-The third concern involves arbitration which
strives for consistency. The fact that some arbitrators rely on court
verdicts and others do not indicates that different standards of
proof may be applied in identical cases. If precedent held that in
cases of criminal conduct, court resolutions regarding guilt are
always or never relevant, parties to the collective bargaining relationship could better prepare their arguments in advance. Such
consistency in practice, afterall, would not be unique to arbitration. As Shulman wrote:
Even in the absence of arbitration, the parties themselves seek
to establish a form of stare decisis or precedent for their own
guidance-by statements of policy, instructions, manuals of
procedure, and the like .... When the parties submit to arbi-

70 It should be noted that not all arbitrators agree that the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard is inappropriate for arbitration. In criminal cases or those involving moral turpitude, some arbitrators hold that the higher degree of proof is required. See
MARIviN HI.L, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 33 (2d ed. 1987). If
so, then the application of criminal court verdicts to indicate guilt in an arbitral hearing
would not be inconsistent.
71 Means Servs., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1213 (1983) (Slade, Arb.).

72

Feller, supra note 56, at 131.
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tration ... they seek not merely resolution of the particular
stalemate, but guidance for the future, at least for similar cases.
They could hardly have a high opinion of the arbitrator's mind
if it were a constantly changing mind.'3
(d) Puposes.-Finally,arbitrators should be reluctant to rely on
criminal court resolutions in deciding their arbitrations because
the two forums have distinct purposes and concerns. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984' 4 and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
of 1987' s marked a change in the federal government's philosophy toward criminal sentencing. Congress returned to the concept
of retribution for crimes and all but abandoned the idea that
imprisonment was a means of promoting rehabilitation."
In contrast to court sentencing, discharges and arbitral decisions are not about punishment or distributing blame in a moral
sense.77 For example, consider the case of the automobile plant
worker who is convicted of using drugs while off-duty. Why is he
discharged? The company does not discharge him because of the
fact of his drug use, nor because he deserves to be punished. 8

73 Shulman, supra note 51, at 1020.
74 Pub. L No. 98-473, Title II, ch. II, §§ 211-239 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 35513559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586, 3621-3625, 3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
75 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
(1991).

76 Id.; see also Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988); Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989) (Under indeterminate sentencing, "[s]erious
disparities in sentences ... were common. Rehabilitation as a sound penological theory
came to be questioned and, in any event, was regarded by some as an unattainable goal
for most cases.").
77 At least one author points to the Supreme Court for the proposition that the
purpose of a criminal sanction is distributing blame:
Criminal sanctions are imposed upon offenders because they have committed a
morally reprehensible act and, therefore, are subject to blame. Moral repugnance
to the actor in a criminal situation is the only justifiable basis for distinguishing
the criminal law from other kinds of legal actions (such as tort claims) against
persons who injure, and the purposes of criminal law should be served by our
penal sanctions .... Recognition of the role that blame must play in a valid
sentencing scheme requires . . . a central focus on the ad the offender committed and the moral culpability with which he committed it.
RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALrrY AND DESERT

16, 17

(1979) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and summarizing just deserts
jurisprudence).
78 Nor should the arbitrator be concerned with such matters. Arbitrator Bard writes
that moral judgments are beyond the scope of the arbitrator's task:
[A]n arbitrator in making a ruling as to whether or not an employee who has
committed a crime or pled guilty to a criminal charge ought to be punished by

1993]

NOTE-ARBITRAL PRACTICE AND PURPOSE

He is discharged because
the company. 9 As Abrams
viewed as punishment for
is discharged because his
may do in the future. " '

of the implications, of his drug use for
points out, "[d]ischarge should not-be
misconduct ....
Rather, an employee
past actions are indicative of what he

III. CONCLUSION

This Note has attempted to provide insight into arbitral thinking. By examining only cases of employee off-duty misconduct,
this Note has studied how arbitrators reconcile fundamental notions of privacy and individuality with the employer's own unique
concerns. The results of this Note are revealing: arbitrators are
generally pragmatic and look beyond the content of the
employee's conduct to consider its arguably. speculative consequences.
Speculative concerns-such as the possibility that the company
would incur damage to its reputation if the employee were reinstated-form the basis for arbitral decisions more frequently than

his employer is not ruling as to the moral reprehensibility of the alleged actions
of the individual involved-that is for the courts and society to judge. Rather, he is
making a determination based on rights which arise under a Collective Bargaining Agreement. Not merely because an individual has been adjudged guilty of
some sort of moral or criminal malfeasance do his rights as a citizen become
abrogated; nor are his rights under contract thereby nullified.
City of New Hope v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 49, 89 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 427, 430 (1987) (emphasis added).
79 As discussed in Part I, the company may feel it cannot afford to employ a proven
drug user for several reasons. First, his employment may affect the safety of all of the
company's employees, in addition to their morale. His employment would be an added
distraction to workers and supervisors, who would constantly wonder whether he was under the influence of drugs while at work. Second, his drug use may affect the quality of
his work; even if his work product did not suffer in quality, the company could be expected to expend additional resources double-checking his work. Third, his employment
could affect the reputation of the company. Consumers may be less likely to purchase
from an automobile manufacturer who employs drug users, and the company's market
value would surely suffer as a result.
80 Roger I. Abrams, A Theory For the Discharge Case 36 ARBITRATION JOURNAL 24, 25
(1981). Additionally, relying on court decisions in arbitrations presumes an ability to read
courts' minds. However, sentences are a function of a multitude of factors. Within statutory guidelines, courts may grant a defendant a suspended or light sentence because he
is no longer in need of punishment. Alternatively, the judge may weigh the interests of
society in deterring crime against the prospect of the defendant becoming a productive
member of society. Or, he may temper his decision by the reality of overcrowded prisons. Whatever the exact reasoning of the judge, many considerations affect his sentencing
decision and they are largely unavailable to the arbitrator.
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secondary literature acknowledges. This is not inappropriate if one
accepts the proposition that, in addition to protecting the employee from arbitrary employer sanctions, arbitration decisions should
also consider the employer's business interests. There is less justification, however, for arbitrators using criminal court resolutions as
the basis for their decision-making. If the purpose of arbitration is
to resolve disputes which originate from the employer-employee
relationship, its decisions should reflect a distinctly industrial focus.
Robert A. Keaney

